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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN CUAL CO.,
EMERY MINING CORP., and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff/appellant,

Case No. 19134

vs.
TERRY W. SANDSTROM,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND
SECOND INJURY FUND
NATURE OF THE CA$E
The Appellant State Insurance Fund is seeking
reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under Section 35-1-69
Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
DISPOSITION BY THE INOUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Order and the Supplemental Order of the
Industrial Commission addressed two issues:

The first issue

was whether, under Section 35-1-69, as amended, and which
became effective May 12, 1981, the State Insur_ance Fund was
eligible for reimbursement for payments for the accident of
11/23/81 of medical care and temporary total disability prior
to the applicant's date of stabilization.

The Order held:

"Tne State Insurance Fund is not entitled to reimbursement• for
that period. (R-213) The second issue raised was whether
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated applies to the Second

Injury Fund as well as to the employer/insurance carrier.

The

Order held that "the right to compensation shall be wholly
barred" dia not apply to the Second Injury Fund. (R-204)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request the Order of the Industrial
Commission denying reimbursement to the State Insurance Fund
under the amended portion of §35-1-69 Utah Code Annotated for
temporary total disability and payments for medical care be
affirmed.

Respondents further request that the denying of the

Second Injury Fund to the provisions of Section 35-1-99 be
reversed and that any claim for compensation be wholly barred.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sandstrom sustained personal injury in four separate
accidents arising out of or in the course of his employment.
The dates ot these accidents are as follows:
1977, May 4,

November 21,

December 17, 1980, and November 23, 1981.

(R-39)
The first three accidents were while employed by
American Coal Company, who in 1980 changed their name to Emery
Mining Corporation and in November of 1981 he was employed by
Gusco, Inc. (R-38, 39)
The State Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier
for both employers and all the accidents.

On July 30, 1982,

the State Insurance Fund entered into a settlement agreement
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with Sandstrom for the 1981 accident only and was for 10% of
1.iie

The Second Injury Fund was not a party to that

agreement.
Tnere was no permanent impairment attributed to the
1979 accident.
As a result of the other three accidents, applicant
has sufferea a total overall impairment of 20% permanent
partial disability of the whole man to his back and 10%
permanent partial disability of the whole man to his neck.
(R-39) There was also a Settlement Agreement of all the parties
of January 11, 1983.

Appellant's Brief.

In addition to the question of reimbursement under
amendea §35-!-b9, the question was raised as to whether claims
which are "wholly barred" applies to the Second Injury Fund.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does Section 35-1-69 provide for reimbursement to the
insurance carrier for medical expenses and temporary total
disability compensation up to the time of stabilization of
injuriPs W1der the 1981 amendment?

A second issue is whether

Section 35-1-99 applies to the Second Injury Fund.
A corillary issue concerning the first issue on
reimbursement is whether the settlement agreement of July 30,
1982, between Sandstrom and the State Insurance Fund can later
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be redefined or altered to allow the State Insurance Fund to
obtain reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund.
ARGUMENT I
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The Order of the Industrial Commission interpreting
the 1981 amendment or §35-1-69 must be confirmed when supported
by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.
As stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. y. Monfredi, 631
P.2d 888 (1981), and reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic Service
y. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (1982), and in Kincheloe y. State
Insurance Fund, 656 P.2d 440, (1982), the scope of review in
Industrial Commission cases is limited to:
[W]hether the Commission's findings are
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence" to support them. Only
then should the Commission's findings be
displaced.
The conclusions reached by the Commission regarding
the claimed apportionment by the Appellants under Section 35-169 are entirely consistent with what the Commission knew the
changes meant that were made by the legislature to Section 69.
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ARGUMENT II
l981 AMENDMENTS TO 35-1-69 SPECIFICALLY DISALLOWED
APPORTIONMENT FOR MEDICALS AND TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY
UP TO THE END OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY
As has been stated before and as the surge of
appealed cases to this court testifies, the cases of McPhie y.
U.S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976), Intermountain
Health Carey. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977), Wbite y.
Industrial Co!lllDission, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979) and
Intermountain Smelting Corp. y. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah
1980) drastically changed the concept of the law of workmen's
compensation that had been successfully followed for more than
thirty years.

One of the severe changes was in giving

reimbursement to the insurance carrier for medical expenses and
total temporary disability compensation.

The reimbursement was

to be paid by the Second Injury Fund on the basis of the
percentage of permanent partial disability attributable to any
pre-existing condition, related or non-related to the
industrial injuries.
eitter hy

No state law has made such reimbursement

or court ruling.
To bring back some logic to this direction forced

upon the Commission, amendments were proposed in 1981 to the
legislature by Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council.

This

Council has members representing the employer, the employee and
the insurance carrier.

-5-

The changes made by the legislature in Section 35-169 followed the agreed upon amendments prepared by the Advisory
Council.

One of the important amendments was for the very

purpose or reversing the ability of carriers to receive
reimbursement for medicals and temporary total disability
compensation on the basis of the percentage of pre-existing
impairment for the first period of temporary total disability
resulting from the industrial injury.
The following paragraph is entirely new language.
Where the payment of temporary disability
benefits, medical expenses, or other related
items are required as a result of the industrial
injury subject to this section, the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be responsible for
all such temporary benefits. medical care, or
other related items up to the end of the period
of temporary total disability resulting from the
industrial injury.
Any allocation of
disability benefits, medical care, or other
related items following such a period shall be
made between the employer or its insurer and the
second injury fund as provided for herein, and
any payments made by the employer and its
insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate
share shall be recoverable at the time of the
award for combined disabilities if any is made
hereunder. Utah Code Ano. §35-1-69 (Supp.
1981). (Emphasis added.)
It snould be noted that the non-apportionment is •up
to the end of the period of temporary total disability
resulting from the industrial injury.•

This language allows

apportionment for future medicals and future temporary total
disability that occurs after the initial period of temporary
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total disability has ended.

This language of allocation

such a period was insisted upon by some members of
the Advisory Council who didn't want to give up all the
benefits which had accrued to the carriers under the court
interpretation of the old statute.
The amended statute by its wording and by specific
intent now provides for reimbursement only after the initial
period of temporary total disability.
The legislative amendment was drafted by the Council
to read that the employer was obligated to pay all benefits for
the first period of temporary total disability, and that after
such a period, there would be an apportionment between the
employer and the Second Injury Fund for •future" benefits.

The

language of the 1981 amendment above clearly states that the
employer or insurance carrier shall pay compensation benefits
and medical care during the first period of temporary total
disability caused by the industrial accident and then after
"such a period,• there would be an apportionment between the
employer and the Second Injury Fund for "future" benefits.
This case is the first one brought under this
particular part of amended Section 69.

The cases cited by the

State Insurance Fund do not pertain and are not relevant to the
amended language ot that section.

-7-

ARGUMENT III
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 35-1-99 WHICH STATES THAT
"IF NO CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IS FILED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE
ACCIDENT OR THE DATE OF THE LAST PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION,
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION SHALL BE WHOLLY BARRED,"
APPLIES TO THE SECOND INJURY FUND
The Administrative Law Judge, over the objections of
the Second Injury Fund (R-42, 204 and 213)

incorrectly

determined that Section 99 did not apply to the Second Injury
Fund.

The Order then said the Second Injury Fund must pay

compensation and medical for the 1977 and 1979 accidents as
they pre-existed the last accidents, even though the carrier
for all the accidents, the State Insurance Fund, claims
exeptions because of Section 99.
The wording ot the statute is clear and must apply to
all insurers and obligors: " • • • IF NO CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION
IS

WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM

THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT OR THE DATE OF THE LAST PAYMENT OF
COMPENSATION, THE RIGHT TO COMPENSTION SHALL BE WUOLLY
emphasis added.
Obviously the purpose of Section 35-1-99 is to bar
stale or untimely filed claims.

The Statute is clear in its

wording that such claims are wholly barred, not solely barred
against the employer or its insurance carrier.
Section 35-1-99 did

read that - - the right to

compensation shall be wholly barred but that if you fail to
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file a claim within three years you can always receive your
compensation from the Second Injury Fund as a pre-existing
condition.

Such a reading would destroy or abolish the effect

of Section
Section

Should the Industrial Commission interpret
to read as such, the effect of such an

interpretation is that no claims are wholly barred.

In other

words, if the applicant or the applicant's attorney can not
resurrect an old utimely filed claim against the employer, the
party can file for a hearing on a new claim alleging that the
new industrial injury aggravated the "wholly barred" injuries
and therefore, those wholly barred injuries are now preexisting conditions allowing for compensation from the Second
Injury Fund for the previously wholly barred claims.
Consequently, there is no such statute as a wholly barred
claim and the effect is to eliminate Section 35-1-99.
Should it be the desire to alter Section 35-1-99,
such a change should be made by the State Legislature in
redrafting the Statute, and not for the Industrial Commission
or our courts to interpret the Statute to read that a "wholly
barred claim" does not really mean a claim is wholly barred,
but that the claim is merely barred against the defendant
employer and not the other defendant.
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The arguments, if there are any, that Section 35-1-99
is an applicable defense against the employer or its insurance
carrier only, and not the Second Injury Fund would likely be:
1.

Pursuant to prior court determinations,

a wholly barred claim under Section 35-1-99 has
never been applied as a defense against the
right of an applicant to receive compenstion
from the Second Injury Fund.
2.

Pursuant to Section 35-1-69, the Second

Injury Fund must pay compensation on all preexisting incapacities regrdless if the claims
are wholly barred under Section 35-1-99.
The first argument fails because the Utah Supreme
Court has never directly addressed the issue of the
applicability of the statute of limitations defense under the
Utah Coae against the liabiity of the Second Injury Fund.

The

Court has not held that Section 35-1-99 does not apply against
the Second Injury Fund and that if a claim is wholly barred
against the employer, the claim is not "wholly barred" but that
the applicant can now be paid by the Second Injury Fund as a
pre-existing incapacity.

The Second Injury Fund is a separate

entity and as such should be allowed to raise the same defenses
under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes as any other party
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defendant, as the Supreme Court stated in Paoli y. Cottonwood
656 P.2d 410 (Utah 1982).
"The.law creating the Second Injury Fund
provides • • • shall • • • represent the Second
Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to
enforce claims against it • • • The latter
provisions established the Legislature intent
that the Second injury Fund has the capacity to
defend itself against the claims • • • (under
the Workmen's Compensation Statutes) • • •
pursuant to that intent, we have consistently
treated the Second Injury Fund as a separate
entity for the purposes of its defense and
liability for claims • • • n
The Court further stated:
The current employer is only responsible for the
percentage of permanent impairment attributable
to the industrial injury (or injuries), and the
Second Injury Fund is responsible for the
remainder • • • •
The second possible argument is also based on a false
presumption.

The Second Injury Fund does not pay on all pre-

existing incapacities.

Under Calyin Dayid y. Industrial

Commjssion, 649 P.2d 282 (1982), the second Injury Fund does
not pay compenstion for a pre-existing impairment that has
already been compensated.

Also, pursuant to Section 35-1-99,

the Second Injury Fund does n.o.t. pay compensation on a claim
that has been wholly barred by the Statute of Limitations.
It is necessary, of course, that the barring of
claims under Section 99 applied only to industrial accidents
and not to previously incurred incapacities which were not from
industrial accidents.
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To find that the wholly barred industrial claims of
1977 and 1979 can be reinstated as a pre-existing condition,
allows this applicant, and all other similarly situated, to
circumvent this section of the law.

The language of the

Statute is clear and convincing that the 1967 and 1976 claims
may be wholly barred as they apply to both employer and the
Second Injury Fund.

To allow such claims to come through the

back as a pre-existing claims, would open the back door to all
prior claims tht have been barred by Section 35-1-99.
ARGUMENT IV
COMPENSATION AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 1981
ACCIDENT WERE "SETTLED" BY THE JULY 30, 1983 AGREEMENT.
Altllough the previous argument (II) under the
1981 amendment to Section 69 is controlling the Second Injury
Fund is likewise not subject to reimbursing the State Insurance
Fund for 50% of the medicals and total temporary disability
because the 1981 accident had been settled.

A settlement

agreement was made between the State Insurance Fund and Mr.
Sandstrom on July 30, 1982 (R-194).

The State Insurance Fund

cannot now to their benefit after their legal obligation as
stipulated by them in their prior negotiated agreement in order
to refer the case to include reimbursement from the Second
Injury Fund.

See this Respondent's Brief in Rhodes y.
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Industrial Commission, tl9163, a case which is now before the
court.
CONCLUSION
The Commissions Order denying the State Insurance
Fund from receiving reimbursement for medicals and temporary
total disability compensation up to the end of the initial
period ot temporary total disability should be affirmed.

Such

a position was intended and is made clear by the amendments to
Section 35-1-69.
Section 99 precludes any obligation on the Second
Injury Fund for claims which bar recovery from the State
Insurance Fund and other issuers.
DATED this _ .........7Ji.=-- day of August, 1983.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify I mailed two true and exact copies
ot the foregoing Brief of Respondent, first-class, postage
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